Why Lean belongs in a security workflow and how to start modeling real invariants.
Lean is a proof assistant that lets you express system models and security claims as executable, checkable mathematics. It is not a replacement for engineering discipline, but it is the best way to make assumptions explicit and to prove properties that are easy to hand-wave.
This series focuses on using Lean 4 for practical security work. The goal is not to formalize everything, but to prove the properties that would hurt the most if they were wrong.
Lean is strongest when the property is crisp and the failure is expensive. For security work, that usually means:
Lean gives you a proof that the invariant holds for every valid execution. That is a different class of confidence than tests alone.
Proofs scale poorly if the boundary is wrong. The best starting points are small, high-value units:
If you pick a boundary that is too large, you will spend all your time modeling things that are not essential to the property you care about.
Proofs should model the behavior, not the code. Build a minimal state model that captures the actual security risk and ignore everything else.
For example, you can remove networking, persistence, or analytics and still prove a conservation property. That minimal model is often enough to reveal missing invariants and hidden assumptions.
Every security review starts with implicit claims. Make them explicit in Lean:
A good invariant is a total function from state to Prop. Once it exists, you can prove that each operation preserves it.
A reliable workflow for Lean proofs looks like this:
This keeps proofs local and resilient to code evolution.
Lean does not replace tests. It gives you a formal oracle that tests can use. If the proof says an invariant must hold, use property tests and fuzzing to look for violations in the implementation. The formal model becomes the specification the engineering system must satisfy.
The high-leverage path is to prove one or two invariants in Lean, then turn those into fuzzing or property tests that run continuously. Treat the Lean model as your oracle: the fuzzer and property tests generate sequences, and the oracle decides whether the implementation drifted from the proof.
Teams tend to get stuck when they:
If the proof is long, it is often a sign the model is bloated or the property is unclear.
Begin with a single module and a single invariant. The goal is not to formalize an entire codebase, but to identify the smallest model that captures your security argument. Once that is stable, extend the model in small steps.
Part 2 walks through a more realistic escrow-style system with a pending payout queue, a limit on daily exposure, and proofs for the key invariants.
We deliver formal specs, differential fuzzing suites, and conformance reports with remediation guidance.